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BETTING AGAINST PASPA: WHY THE FEDERAL
RESTRICTIONS ON SPORTS GAMBLING ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND HOW THEY
HURT THE STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate surrounding the legalization of sports gambling re-
surfaced nationally when the Supreme Court decided to review the
Third Circuit’s holding in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor
of New Jersey (“Christie II en banc”).1  To date, proponents of legalized
sports gambling have been unsuccessful in attempting to challenge
its federal prohibition.2  However, sports gambling has presented
an interesting topic of legal debate throughout American history.3
Gambling was a large part of old American society.4  But as
sports grew increasingly popular, gambling became associated with
moral and social stigmas.5  In 1992, Congress responded by passing
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA” or
“the Act”), which prohibits states from operating sports gambling
1. 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) [hereinafter Christie II en banc], cert.
granted sub nom. Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27,
2017). See also Matt Bonesteel, In Surprise Move, Supreme Court Says It Will Take on
New Jersey Sports-Betting Case, WASH. POST (June 27, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/06/27/in-surprise-move-supreme-
court-says-it-will-take-on-new-jersey-sports-betting-case/?utm_term=.dcde5e597908
[https://perma.cc/ET5W-QWMD] (stating even if New Jersey is not granted per-
mission to operate unrestricted sports gambling scheme by Supreme Court, resur-
facing debate nationally could lead to reduced levels of restriction by Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act).
2. See generally Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (holding against New Jersey in
its challenge to PASPA); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Gov. of N.J., 799 F.3d 259
(3d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Christie II] (holding against New Jersey in its challenge
to PASPA), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated Order Sur Petitions for Rehearing
En Banc, Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015), and aff’d 832 F.3d
389 (3d Cir. 2015); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Gov. of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d
Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Christie I] (holding against New Jersey in its challenge to
PAPSA).
3. See infra notes 34–56 and accompanying text (explaining transition from R
perception of gambling as civic duty to immoral and corrupt activity).
4. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Exami-
nation of State Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C.L. REV. 11, 12 (1992) (explaining that use
of state lotteries was important tool for governments to bolster weak tax base).
5. For a discussion on the changes in public perception that coincided with
the rise in sports gambling popularity, see infra notes 19–56 and accompanying R
text (explaining government’s desire to intervene and sharply crack down on
sports gambling industry during this time due to enhanced corruption).
(453)
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schemes.6  This was an important milestone in the history of Ameri-
can sports gambling, but today the Act faces tremendous pressure
due to questions about its effectiveness and constitutionality.7  With
millions of potential revenue dollars on the line, some states have
decided to make the effort to challenge PASPA in court.8  Challeng-
ers allege that the law is counterproductive in targeting corruption
and raises constitutional concerns.9  Supporters of PASPA, mainly
the NCAA and professional sports leagues, argue that it prevents
corruption associated with sports gambling.10
Part II(A) of this article provides a historical background on
sports gambling in the United States between the 18th century and
the early 1990s, when PASPA was enacted.11  Part II(B) discusses
the controversial language of PASPA and the implications of this
language on statutory interpretation.12  Part II(C) details some of
the high-profile legal challenges to PASPA, which were largely influ-
6. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012) (serving as primary obstacle for states
attempting to legalize sports gambling today).
7. See Dustin Gouker, New Congressional Bill Would End Sports Betting Ban, but
What Are Its Odds of Passing Soon?, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 25, 2017), https://www
.legalsportsreport.com/14148/congress-sports-betting-bill-paspa/ [https://perma
.cc/4ZT7-NR7H] (mentioning another potential milestone called Gaming Ac-
countability and Modern Enhancement Act (“GAME”) presented by House Energy
and Commerce Committee in Congress that would repeal PASPA). See also infra
notes 201–215 and accompanying text (providing examples of how legalization R
would lead to increased regulation of gambling and decreased levels of gambling-
related corruption); infra notes 98–176 and accompanying text (explaining New R
Jersey’s argument that PASPA is coercive and raises concerns of equal sovereignty
because of relatively unrestricted gambling laws that exist only in Nevada).
8. See infra notes 181–196 and accompanying text (highlighting potential tax R
dollars and job creation that could benefit states if not for PASPA funneling re-
sources to criminal organizations and offshore websites).
9. See Andy Staples, The NCAA Needs to Start Planning for a World Where Sports
Betting is Widely Legal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 30, 2017), https://www.si.com/
college-football/2017/06/30/ncaa-gambling-paspa-sports-betting-compensation
[https://perma.cc/9BWG-JUAH] (stating NBA players would have little incentive
to fix games today because doing so would require risk of forfeiting eight-figure
salaries for relatively small reward). See also Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir.
2013) (highlighting New Jersey’s constitutional arguments regarding issues of
standing, Commerce Clause, anti-commandeering, and equal sovereignty).
10. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 221–22 (agreeing with leagues’ legal standing
argument to bring suit against New Jersey for potential corruption-related harm
caused by increased gambling on sports).
11. See infra notes 19–56 and accompanying text (highlighting shifts in gam- R
bling trends among specific sports and discussing major sports betting scandals).
12. See infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text (focusing on debate about R
meaning of PASPA’s language which prohibits states from “authorizing” sports wa-
gering schemes).
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enced by its controversial language, discussed in Part II(B).13  Next,
Part III explains why PASPA is unconstitutional and how it nega-
tively affects states.14  Part III(A) discusses the unconstitutionality of
PASPA and how it violates the “anti-commandeering” doctrine
under the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, ex-
plained in Part III(A)(1).15 Part III(A) analyzes legal issues histori-
cally surrounding the ban on sports gambling, including equal
sovereignty, standing, and the Commerce Clause, all of which have
been litigated in federal court.16  Part III(B) argues that PASPA is
bad law from a policy perspective and engages the counter-argu-
ment that PASPA protects consumers by comparing sports gam-
bling in legal and illegal markets globally.17  Finally, Part III(B)
explains why the alleged social concerns associated with sports gam-
bling are not adequately addressed by PASPA and describes the
evolution of Americans’ moral views on sports gambling since its
enactment.18
II. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE STAGE FOR A
SUPREME COURT SHOWDOWN
A. The History of American Sports Gambling
Gambling has existed for hundreds of years in the United
States.19  In 18th century America, the government used gambling
revenue to “build cities, establish universities, and even to help fi-
nance the Revolutionary War.”20  Sports gambling in America traces
13. See infra notes 68–90 and accompanying text (demonstrating different R
ways in which states have chosen to challenge PASPA and explaining why such
challenges have been unsuccessful to date).
14. See infra notes 91–238 and accompanying text (analyzing PASPA from le- R
gal, economic, social, and moral perspectives and discussing its role in protecting
consumers).
15. See infra notes 98–176 and accompanying text (discussing where PASPA R
fits in small body of Supreme Court case law regarding Tenth Amendment with
respect to anti-commandeering).
16. See infra notes 141–176 and accompanying text (noting that while legal R
issues not pertaining to anti-commandeering have been litigated, importance of
issues at Supreme Court level is minimal in comparison).
17. See infra notes 200–215 and accompanying text (focusing primarily on le- R
gal market in United Kingdom).
18. See infra notes 229–238 and accompanying text (arguing that since nega- R
tive moral perception of sports gambling was used to promote passage of PASPA,
shift towards more positive moral perception should play role in argument today).
19. See Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 571 (2013) (ex-
plaining that gambling was used during colonial times for fundraising by local
governments).
20. Rychlak, supra note 4, at 12. R
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its roots back to a sport known as “pedestrianism,” a form of race-
walking that gained popularity in England and spread to the
United States as people gambled on the results.21  In addition to
pedestrianism, colonists bet on “horse races, cockfights, and bare-
knuckle brawls” for entertainment.22
Throughout the 19th and into the 20th century, horseracing
became the most popular sporting event for gamblers, although it
was initially reserved for the wealthy.23  However, after the Civil
War, more racetracks came into existence and people from all
socio-economic backgrounds began to participate.24  By the 1920s,
there were more than 300 racetracks throughout the United States
and thousands of “off-track” betting facilities.25  But as Americans’
interests shifted more towards team sports in the 1930s, betting on
horseracing began to decline steadily.26
After the decline of horseracing, the growth of baseball filled
the void for Americans looking to gamble on sports.27  Professional
sports in general became increasingly popular during the early 20th
century, and, as a result, this period became known as the “Golden
Age of Sports.”28  This increased popularity led to a sharp rise in
21. See generally Allen Moody, History of Sports Betting, THOUGHTCO, https://
www.thoughtco.com/history-of-sports-betting-3116857 [https://perma.cc/EZ8K-
SGVQ] (last updated May 2, 2017) (providing general history of sports gambling
globally and transition of sports gambling from other parts of world to United
States over time). See also In the 1870’s and 80’s, Being a Pedestrian Was Anything But,
NPR (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/04/03/297327865/in-the-1870s-
and-80s-being-a-pedestrian-was-anything-but (explaining that bets were placed on,
for example, which competitors would be first to drop out of race or which would
be first to reach 100 miles in distance traveled).
22. Jeremy Martin, History of Sports Betting and the Point Spread, DOC’S SPORTS
SERV. (May 30, 2017), https://www.docsports.com/sports-betting-history.html
[https://perma.cc/KX6H-NKYZ] (discussing foundations of sports gambling in
United States dating back to Founding Fathers and early colonists).
23. See id. (discussing evolution of initial stages of sports gambling in United
States).
24. See id. (marking beginning of massive rise in sports gambling popularity
that continues to grow today).
25. See id. (providing Americans with greater access to sports gambling and
contributing to rapid growth in sports gambling industry prior to popularity of
developed professional sports leagues).
26. See id. (explaining that downturn in horseracing occurred primarily as a
result of formation of professional sports leagues, which quickly became popular
among Americans).
27. See Moody, supra note 21 (marking rise in popularity of gambling on pro- R
fessional sports leagues as opposed to events like pedestrianism and horse racing).
28. Woo, supra note 19, at 573 (referring to rise in popularity and attendance R
of professional baseball, professional and collegiate football, and collegiate
basketball).
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sports gambling.29  But during this time, bettors were restricted on
the types of wagers they could place, which prevented widespread
growth of the industry despite great demand.30  In an effort to ad-
dress these limitations, bookmakers (“bookies”) developed the
point-spread system in the 1940s, which allowed gamblers to bet on
the accuracy of a particular score line rather than just the binary
outcome of a competition.31  This created a massive increase in the
amount of sports gambling in the United States because it elimi-
nated the limitations that both bettors and bookies faced prior to
the existence of the point-spread system.32  With the point-spread
system in place, sports gambling continues to increase in
popularity.33
The public perception of gambling, on the other hand, has
varied over time.34  For example, playing the lottery was initially
perceived by the public to be a civic duty because colonies were
using its revenues to finance local governments.35  However, as
gambling-related corruption became more prevalent over time,
America’s perspective on betting shifted negatively.36
29. See id. (causing many to become suspicious of connection between rise in
popularity of professional sports and increased instances of corruption and
scandal).
30. See Moody, supra note 21 (explaining that under such restrictions, gam- R
blers were forced to risk too much money when betting on prohibitive favorite in
sporting events to deem making wagers reasonable).
31. See id. (explaining that point system allowed bettors to gamble on any
sport regardless of relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing teams, opening
door for more sports gambling activity).
32. See id. (referring to fact that point-spread system was key in capturing pre-
viously-unrecognized demand for sports gambling by providing betting access on
almost any professional sporting event).
33. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Betting on sports is an
activity that has unarguably increased in popularity over the last several decades.”).
34. See Woo, supra note 19, at 573 (referring to instances such as 1919 Black R
Sox Scandal in professional baseball that contributed to negative perception of
sports gambling at times throughout history). See also Jeff Merron, Biggest Sports
Gambling Scandals, ESPN (2009), http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=
merron/060207 [https://perma.cc/CF3G-W8JT] (noting additional scandals re-
lated to sports gambling throughout history that contributed to negative percep-
tion, such as 1951 point-shaving scandal in college basketball, banning of Pete
Rose from professional baseball for betting on games in which he was involved as
player and manager, and Boston College’s connection to mob activity with respect
to “point shaving” in college basketball in late 1970s).
35. See Woo, supra note 19, at 571–72 (citing CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP R
J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 32–33 (1991)) (noting use of
state lotteries as source of significant revenue for state governments).
36. See Zach Schreiber, Comment, The Time Is Now: Why the United States Should
Adopt the British Model of Sports Betting Legislation, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 353, 360 (2017) (discussing shifts between positive and negative public
perception of sports gambling from mid 1800s to 1930s).
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In 1951, thirty-five former and active college basketball players
were accused of fixing at least eighty-six games.37  As a result, some
high-profile athletes were banned from collegiate and professional
basketball.38  In addition, the perennial powerhouse Kentucky
Wildcats, winners of back-to-back NCAA championships at the time,
were banned from play in the 1952–53 season.39
Another famous scandal that negatively affected public percep-
tion of sports gambling was an incident involving Pete Rose, an icon
in professional baseball in the 1980s.40  Rose was caught betting on
professional baseball games in which he was personally involved as
a manager and subsequently received a lifetime ban from the game
of baseball.41  Not only did the lifetime ban cost Rose a potentially
long, lucrative career as a baseball manager, but it denied him what
would have been a guaranteed place in professional baseball’s Hall
of Fame.42
The most famous match-fixing scandal in American history,
baseball’s 1919 “Black Sox Scandal,” was the biggest contributor to
the trend of negative perception towards sports gambling.43  Sev-
eral players from the 1919 White Sox, considered to be one of the
greatest teams in the history of professional baseball, carried out a
plan to fix the World Series in exchange for payoffs from gamblers
associated with organized crime.44  As a result, eight White Sox play-
ers were banned from baseball, but the suspected fixers, including
Arnold Rothstein, a notorious New York mobster and gambler at
37. See Merron, supra note 34 (noting that twenty of these players were con- R
victed along with fourteen gamblers).
38. See id. (referring mainly to Ralph Beard and Alex Groza, both All-Ameri-
cans at University of Kentucky and first-team NBA All-Stars prior to receiving bans
from sport of basketball).
39. See id. (pointing out particular significance of this “death penalty” because
of high profile nature of team and fact that team was favored once again to repeat
as national champions).
40. See id. (explaining Rose’s eventual admission to betting on baseball games
after initially denying all allegations).
41. See id. (noting then-MLB commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti’s statement
after publicizing Rose’s lifetime ban, “[l]et no one think [Rose’s betting] did not
hurt baseball”).
42. See id. (using severity of Rose’s punishment to demonstrate perceived se-
verity of such actions at this time).
43. See Woo, supra note 19, at 572 (detailing infamous bribe by notorious R
gangster Arnold Rothstein to members of Chicago White Sox to throw 1919 World
Series against Cincinnati Reds).
44. See Alan Solomon, The Black Sox, CHI. TRIB. (2017), http://www.chicago-
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-blacksox-story-story.html
[https://perma.cc/C9FP-56JY] (citing rumor that White Sox pitcher Eddie Cicotte
hit Cincinnati Reds leadoff batter with second pitch of opening game of series as
signal to bettors that fix was taking place).
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the helm of the scheme, received no punishment.45  Although not
the first incident of match fixing in American professional sports,
the 1919 World Series had a major impact on the public’s percep-
tion of sports gambling because it came at a time when the popular-
ity of the World Series was greater than ever before.46  By the 1960s,
public perception was negative enough to persuade Congress to
pass legislation banning certain interstate gambling.47
This trend continued as President George H.W. Bush signed
PASPA into law in 1992, instituting the legal restrictions on sports
gambling that exist today.48  Proponents of PASPA argued that it
was necessary for the protection of the integrity of sports and the
protection of minors from the so-called “vice” of gambling.49  They
argued that state-sanctioned sports gambling was problematic be-
cause it attracted additional gamblers who would only bet in state-
sanctioned schemes.50  When former NFL Commissioner, Paul Tag-
liabue, was asked how state-sanctioned sports gambling would make
a difference on the market given the fact that huge amounts of
money were already being gambled illegally on sports, he re-
sponded “there will be millions of Americans induced and seduced
into gambling if this growth industry is permitted to take the impri-
matur of the state and support state-sanctioned point-spread
betting.”51
More recently, however, society’s perception of sports gam-
bling has shifted back in favor of a more lenient approach to regu-
lation of the activity.52  Americans today view the legalization of
45. See id. (explaining that scandal destroyed one of baseball’s great teams
and had “shaken” America’s national game).
46. See id. (highlighting fact that 1919 World Series was so popular because it
was first major sporting event after World War I).
47. See id. (referring to Federal Wire Act of 1961, which was enacted to “crack
down” on gambling orchestrated by organized crime members).
48. See Justin Fielkow et al., Tackling PASPA: The Past, Present and Future of
Sports Gambling in America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 29–30 (2016) (explaining that
although most states had already banned sports betting on their own prior to this
act, PASPA eliminated states’ freedom to legalize sports gambling even if they de-
sired to do so). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012) (making it unlawful for any
state to “sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize” sports wagering
schemes) (emphasis added).
49. See Fielkow et al., supra note 48, at 29–30 (stating PAPSA emerged from R
strong negative public perception that developed around sports gambling).
50. See id. (serving as primary argument for proponents of PASPA in push to
implement Act in early 1990s).
51. Id. at 31 (quoting Tagliabue).
52. See, e.g., Wayne Parry, Poll: Nearly Half in US Support Legalized Sports Betting,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/poll-nearly-
half-in-us-support-legalized-sports-betting/ (citing poll by Fairleigh Dickinson Uni-
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sports gambling more favorably than they did in the late twentieth
century, though for different reasons than in the past.53  Even the
commissioners of several professional sports leagues, whose prede-
cessors represented a driving force behind the implementation of
today’s restrictions on sports gambling in the United States, pub-
licly expressed opinions recognizing the change.54  This shift in per-
ception rekindled national attention on the issue and even led to
federal lawsuits.55  The combination of positive public perception
and advances in modern technology have increased gamblers’ will-
ingness and ability to circumvent PASPA, which prompted Con-
gress to create even more laws in an attempt to fortify its anti-sports
initiative.56
B. PASPA’s Controversial Language and Its Implications
PASPA makes it unlawful for a state to “sponsor, operate, ad-
vertise, promote, license, or authorize” sports wagering schemes.57
This language, specifically the use of the word “authorize,” creates a
debate on statutory interpretation.58  The major question surround-
ing the application of this statute is whether it considers a state’s
repeal of existing sports gambling prohibitions a form of authoriza-
tion.59  Proponents of PASPA argue that a repeal of laws that pro-
versity showing 48% of Americans are in favor of changing federal law to legalize
sports gambling compared to 39% not in favor).
53. See id. (explaining that those in favor of sports gambling hold this opinion
because of fact that gambling on sports occurs despite being illegal and that legali-
zation would bring in revenue for states).
54. See generally American Attitudes on Sports Betting Have Changed, AM. SPORTS
BETTING COALITION (2017), http://www.sportsbettinginamerica.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/5L2J-E4RL] (referring to NFL commissioner Roger Goodell,
NBA commissioner Adam Silver, former NBA commissioner David Stern, MLB
commissioner Rob Manfred, and NHL commission Gary Bettman).
55. See id. (mentioning New Jersey’s eight-year legal battle in federal court
against PASPA, which was supported by citizens of New Jersey).
56. See Timothy Furman, Comment, Going All In: New Jersey and the Sports Bet-
ting Landscape, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 111, 113–14 (2015) (citing 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5361–5367 (2012)) (discussing Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
passed in 2006, which limits ability of growing number of offshore websites to con-
duct financial transactions with customers in United States).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (emphasis added).
58. See Daniel L. Wallach, US Sports Betting: Why Statutory Interpretation May Be
Key to New Jersey’s Efforts to Legalize Gambling, LAWINSPORT (July 1, 2015), https://
www.lawinsport.com/features/item/us-sports-betting-why-statutory-interpretation-
may-be-key-to-new-jersey-s-efforts-to-legalize-gambling [https://perma.cc/75PR-
2B9J] (raising key question as to meaning of word “authorize”).
59. See id. (discussing that when term is not defined in statute, courts gener-
ally interpret term under ordinary meaning, which in this case benefits states look-
ing to challenge PASPA because dictionaries define “authorize” as “to give legal
authority” and “to grant authority or power to.  To give permission for; sanction”).
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hibit sports gambling is a form of authorization because it
effectively allows the activity to occur.60  Challengers of PASPA ar-
gue that a repeal of prohibitions on sports gambling is not an au-
thorization of the activity because it does not result in any state
involvement in sports gambling.61  In other words, challengers of
the Act argue that in order to “authorize” sports gambling, states
have to license or affirmatively promote the activity.62
The Act allows states that already had sports gambling opera-
tions in place to apply for an exemption from the law “to the extent
that the scheme was conducted by that State” prior to PASPA.63  In
addition, it allowed any state that had commercial casinos for at
least ten years prior to its enactment to authorize legal sports gam-
bling within one year of the effective date.64  However, no states are
specifically named in the PASPA legislation.65  Nevada, Oregon,
Montana, and Delaware, the four states that had sports gambling
laws in place prior to PASPA, were the only states to take advantage
of the exemptions.66  “Of these four states, Nevada is the only one”
that permits sports gambling “without any significant restrictions.”67
60. See id. (explaining that repeal of laws prohibiting sports gambling is
equivalent to decriminalization of sports gambling, which is an impermissible cir-
cumvention of PASPA).
61. See id. (explaining New Jersey’s argument in Christie II and Christie II en
banc that “authorize” does not mean merely “to permit” or “to allow” but rather to
affirmatively sanction something).
62. See id. (quoting Judge Julio M. Fuentes of Third Circuit, “[a] repealer is a
removal of the restrictions and of all criminal laws, but it doesn’t mean that the
government is saying ‘go ahead and engage in that activity’”).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 3704; see also OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293,
304 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that phrase “to the extent” in PASPA is construed
narrowly, therefore Delaware can only allow multi-game bets on NFL games be-
cause that is specifically what it allowed prior to PASPA); What Is PASPA?—Profes-
sional & Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, LEGAL GAMBLING USA (2015), http://
www.legalgamblingusa.com/articles/what-is-paspa.html [https://perma.cc/
4CDW-29DW] (meaning that under PASPA states are permitted to sanction sports
gambling in same manner they sanctioned it prior to PASPA).
64. See § 3704(a)(3)(B) (stating exception); see also Michael Levinson, Com-
ment, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit from Legalized Sports Wagering, 13
SPORTS L. J. 143, 149 (2006) (explaining that exemption was created with New
Jersey in mind because of its casino operations in Atlantic City).
65. See Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Comment, Betting Against the House (and Sen-
ate): The Case for Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY.
L.J. 163, 163–64 (2011) (meaning no states were given an explicit exception to
PASPA and “grandfather clause” was generally applicable for states that had sports
betting in place prior to PASPA).
66. See id. at 164 (mentioning New Jersey’s failure to take advantage of excep-
tion, thus barring state from allowing sports gambling activity currently).
67. Furman, supra note 56, at 113 (citation omitted) (referring to lack of re- R
strictions on things such as accepting multiple-game bets as opposed to bets on
outcome of single game).
9
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C. Notable Challenges to PASPA
When Congress initially debated PASPA, the Department of
Justice opposed its enactment and the Act has been criticized often
since it was passed.68  During the Act’s 1991 congressional hearing,
one representative commented, “my reaction is that we’re trying to
close the barn door here after it’s already been opened and a great
many of the horses have escaped.  I just don’t know whether we can
corral those horses and put them back in the barn.”69
States have also challenged PASPA.70  In 2009, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit heard OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell71
regarding former Delaware Governor Jack Markell’s proposed legis-
lation authorizing point-spread bets on individual games, over/
under bets on individual games, and multi-game parlay bets.72  Sev-
eral major sports leagues subsequently filed suit for violations of
PASPA.73
Today, New Jersey is the most adamant challenger of PASPA.74
In 2011, New Jersey citizens successfully voted to amend the state’s
constitution and allow the state legislature to legalize sports gam-
bling.75  In 2012, the state legislature legalized sports betting de-
spite knowing its laws directly conflicted with PASPA.76  This was
68. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal
Sovereignty Problem, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2017) (mentioning Department of
Justice’s disapproval of way in which PASPA was drafted and referring to PASPA’s
negative legislative history).
69. Id. (quoting Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.
74 Before the Subcomm. on Econ. & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 92 (1991) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli)) (referring to fact that PASPA
was being implemented too late to be effective because underground market for
sports betting was already well developed).
70. See, e.g., OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2009)
(Delaware’s challenge of PASPA).
71. 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009).
72. See id. at 295 (noting Governor Markell’s efforts to implement sports bet-
ting legislation).
73. See id. at 293 (listing plaintiffs, including Major League Baseball, National
Basketball Association, National Collegiate Athletic Association, National Football
League, and National Hockey League, which all requested court to enjoin Dela-
ware from permitting previously-mentioned betting schemes).
74. See Furman, supra note 56, at 111 (discussing New Jersey’s efforts to bring R
sports betting to Atlantic City).
75. See Christopher L. Soriano, The Efforts to Legalize Sports Betting in New
Jersey–A History, N.J. LAW. 22, 24 (Apr. 2013), https://www.duanemorris.com/arti-
cles/static/soriano_njlawyer_0413.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XHR-4CNB] (noting
that this served as first major step by New Jersey in its campaign to fight PASPA).
76. See id. (“The legislation allowed the Division of Gaming Enforcement to
approve a casino licensee’s application to operate sports betting, and to allow the
division and the New Jersey Racing Commission to jointly approve a racetrack’s
application to operate sports betting.”).
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss2/6
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS207.txt unknown Seq: 11 30-JUL-18 12:38
2018] BETTING AGAINST PASPA 463
essentially New Jersey’s invitation to the proponents of PASPA to
engage in a legal battle to rebut its argument that PASPA is
unconstitutional.77
In January 2012, New Jersey governor Chris Christie signed the
legislation to allow sports betting in New Jersey.78  In the 2013 case
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of New Jersey (“Christie
I”),79 several professional and amateur sports leagues took to the
courts in an attempt to strike down New Jersey’s proposed sports
gambling laws.80  They argued that these laws were in direct viola-
tion of the federal restrictions on sports gambling under PASPA.81
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in favor of the
sports leagues and rejected New Jersey’s argument that PASPA is
unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.82
In 2014, New Jersey responded with a more creative approach
to its attempt to legalize sports gambling in National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association v. Governor of New Jersey (“Christie II”).83  In light of
the Third Circuit’s holding in Christie I, which held that PASPA did
not affirmatively require action by prohibiting states from repealing
bans on sports wagering, but rather let states choose which laws to
leave in place, the state decided to partially repeal its existing
prohibitions on sports gambling instead of affirmatively legalizing
sports gambling as it had previously done.84  The NCAA and the
77. See id. (explaining New Jersey’s strategy to purposely violate PASPA with
intention to put forth its constitutional arguments when challenged in federal
court).
78. See Sarah Coffey, N.J. Moves Towards Legal Sports Betting this Fall, in Time for
NFL Season, NAT’L L. REV. (May 25, 2012), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
nj-moves-towards-legal-sports-betting-fall-time-nfl-season [https://perma.cc/9B8U-
DH5Y] (explaining then-Governor Christie’s plans to implement sports betting sys-
tems in New Jersey racetracks and casinos in Fall of 2012).
79. 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
80. See generally id. (marking first major step in New Jersey’s legal challenge to
prove PASPA’s unconstitutionality).
81. See id. at 214 (“A conglomerate of sports leagues, displeased at the pros-
pect of State-licensed gambling on their athletic contests, has sued to halt these
efforts.  They contend, alongside the United States as intervening plaintiff, that
New Jersey’s proposed law violates a federal law that prohibits most states from
licensing sports gambling, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of
1992 (PASPA).”).
82. See id. at 237 (establishing key point of legal controversy that continues to
be biggest question today regarding whether PASPA is constitutional).
83. 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated Order Sur
Petitions for Rehearing En Banc, Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14,
2015), and aff’d 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2015).
84. See id. at 264 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-7 (2014), invalidated by Christie
II en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Christie v. Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27, 2017)) (noting New Jersey’s second
attempt to pass law to legalize sports betting).
11
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major sports leagues filed suit once again, and the court held
against New Jersey.85  Upon rehearing, the en banc Third Circuit
affirmed the decision.86  The court held that New Jersey’s use of the
word “repeal” was not enough to escape the fact that its legislation
effectively authorized sports gambling.87  According to the court,
although New Jersey was accomplishing its objective through a re-
peal, the action had the effect of affirmatively authorizing sports
gambling in violation of PASPA.88  The opinion stated that “a state’s
decision to selectively remove a prohibition on sports wagering in a
manner that permissively channels wagering activity to particular
locations or operators is, in essence, ‘authorization’ under
PASPA.”89
But this development was historic because the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the en banc decision, meaning it will review
the constitutionality of PASPA for the first time.90
III. ANALYSIS: PASPA’S QUESTIONABLE CONSTITUTIONALITY
AND HOW STATES WOULD BENEFIT FROM
LEGAL SPORTS GAMBLING
Part A of this section provides a detailed discussion of the con-
stitutional issues surrounding PASPA.91  Part III (A)(1) analyzes the
Third Circuit’s review of Christie II and argues that the Supreme
Court should overturn the en banc decision because PASPA violates
85. See id. at 268 (holding that New Jersey’s legislative action violated PASPA).
86. See Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d at 402 (refusing to strike PASPA despite
New Jersey’s repeated attempts to assert violations of Tenth Amendment).
87. See id. at 397 (“The presence of the word ‘repeal’ does not prevent us
from examining what the provision actually does, and the Legislature’s use of the
term does not change that the 2014 Law selectively grants permission to certain
entities to engage in sports gambling.”).
88. See id. at 398 (“We conclude that the 2014 Law violates PASPA because it
authorizes by law sports gambling.”).
89. Id. at 401.
90. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27,
2017); Nick Corasaniti, New Jersey’s Appeal of Sports Betting Ban Heads to Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/nyre-
gion/new-jerseys-appeal-of-sports-betting-ban-heads-to-supreme-court.html (“The
Supreme Court agreed . . . to hear an appeal from Gov. Chris Christie and the state
of New Jersey to allow betting on professional and collegiate sports at the state’s
casinos and racetracks.”).  See also Supreme Court Procedures, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-edu-
cational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 [https://perma.cc/82FN-9CMB]
(defining granting of “certiorari” as Supreme Court’s decision to review decision
of lower court even though it is under no obligation to hear case).
91. See infra notes 98–176 and accompanying text (using holding in Christie R
cases as framework for constitutional analysis of PASPA).
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the anti-commandeering doctrine.92  Parts III (A)(2), III (A)(3),
and III (A)(4) analyze other legal issues addressed by the Third
Circuit in Christie I, Christie II, and Christie II en banc.93
Part (B) of this section argues that PASPA is bad law from a
policy perspective.94  Part III (B)(1) examines the economic bene-
fits that PASPA forces states to miss out on by prohibiting a legal
sports gambling market in the United States.95  Part III (B)(2) ar-
gues that PASPA has counterproductive effects on consumer pro-
tection by highlighting the major differences between legal and
illegal sports gambling markets.96  Parts III (B)(3) and III (B)(4),
respectively, discuss why the social and moral concerns raised by
proponents of PASPA are largely without merit.97
A. The Constitutionality of PASPA
Christie II en banc is the most recent high-profile case detailing
the major legal issues behind sports gambling in the United
States.98  After New Jersey’s attempt to circumvent PASPA by par-
tially repealing its existing sports gambling laws, the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and a number of professional
leagues sued seeking an injunction against the enactment of the
legislation.99  The plaintiffs in this case included the NCAA, the Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League
(NFL), the National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League
92. See infra notes 108–140 and accompanying text (providing detailed analy- R
sis on Third Circuit’s decision to deny New Jersey’s challenge to PASPA based on
Tenth Amendment, equal sovereignty, legal standing, and Commerce Clause).
93. See infra notes 141–176 and accompanying text (discussing law surround- R
ing equal sovereignty, standing, and Commerce Clause as it relates to PASPA).
94. See infra notes 177–238 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of R
sports gambling related to economics, consumer protection, costs to society, and
morality).
95. See infra notes 181–199 and accompanying text (noting most importantly R
that primary effect of keeping sports gambling illegal is to shift resources to crimi-
nal activity and offshore websites without reducing overall amount of gambling).
96. See infra notes 200–215 and accompanying text (using legal sports gam- R
bling market in United Kingdom as primary subject of comparison).
97. See infra notes 216–238 and accompanying text (weighing benefits and R
costs of sports gambling from perspective of states).
98. See generally Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub
nom. Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27, 2017).
(upholding PASPA’s constitutionality for the time being).
99. See generally Christie II, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated Order Sur Petitions for Rehearing En Banc, Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568,
14-4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015), and aff’d 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2015) (arguing that
New Jersey’s proposed law violated federal prohibition on sports gambling and
could potentially cause reputational harm to NCAA and leagues).
13
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Baseball (MLB).100  After the Third Circuit held for the sports
leagues in Christie II, and affirmed en banc, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.101
The most important constitutional issue presented in this case
was whether PASPA violates the Tenth Amendment under the Su-
preme Court’s “anti-commandeering doctrine.”102  The Supreme
Court’s two well-known decisions in this area, discussed below,
stand for the general principle that the federal government cannot
commandeer state governments.103  In other words, the federal gov-
ernment cannot coerce states into taking certain legislative ac-
tions.104  PASPA presents an interesting distinction with regard to
this principle because it prohibits states from repealing their laws ban-
ning sports gambling, but it does not actually force states to take any
affirmative action.105  Likely, whether the Supreme Court finds
PASPA’s requirement that states not do something to be an instance
of unconstitutional commandeering will decide its holding.106
Along with this Tenth Amendment issue, the Third Circuit has ad-
dressed issues of equal sovereignty, standing, and the Commerce
Clause with respect to PASPA.107
100. See id. at 259 (listing plaintiffs, which represented each of the four major
American sports leagues and the major American collegiate athletic body).
101. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017); see
also UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 90 (defining granting of “certiorari” as Su- R
preme Court’s decision to review decision of lower court even though it is under
no obligation to hear case).
102. See Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d at 399–403 (discussing anti-comman-
deering doctrine).
103. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding
Congress may not force states to implement or carry out federal programs because
it is violation of state sovereignty); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992) (explaining that while Congress could regulate disposal of radioactive waste
under Commerce Clause due to interstate nature of market, it could not force
states to take title to such waste).
104. See generally Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at
159–62 (highlighting instances of federal government forcing states to use states’
own resources to carry out federal programs as evidence of unconstitutional
commandeering).
105. See Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d at 402 (“Put simply, PASPA does not im-
pose a coercive either-or requirement or affirmative command.”).
106. See id. (focusing primarily on distinction between forcing states to take
affirmative action and prohibiting states from taking action as it relates to anti-
commandeering).
107. See generally Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 215–37 (3d Cir. 2013) (outlining ma-
jor legal issues litigated between sports leagues and New Jersey).
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss2/6
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS207.txt unknown Seq: 15 30-JUL-18 12:38
2018] BETTING AGAINST PASPA 467
1. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
The notion of commandeering concerns federalism, a founda-
tional aspect of American constitutional law that reserves certain
sovereign authority to the states.108  The text of the Tenth Amend-
ment reads “the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”109  There are two seminal de-
cisions by the Supreme Court that overturned laws based on uncon-
stitutional commandeering by the federal government.110
The first case is New York v. United States,111 which overturned a
federal statute requiring states to either dispose of, or take title to,
radioactive waste produced within their borders.112  The Court in
New York held that the federal government cannot force states to
take title to the waste.113  The Court decided that Congress crossed
the line between lawful encouragement and unlawful coercion by
forcing states to take title to the waste as an alternative to regulating
pursuant to Congress’s direction.114
The second case, Printz v. United States,115 overturned a federal
law requiring local and state governments to implement mandatory
background checks before issuing firearm permits.116  The Court in
Printz held that not only is Congress prohibited from compelling
states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program under New
York, but it is also prohibited from forcing state officials to adminis-
108. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 915–17 (serving as one of two well-known Supreme
Court holdings specifically about anti-commandeering subset of federalism).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
110. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898; New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (providing context for how rare such cases reach Supreme
Court).
111. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
112. See id. at 188 (providing classic example of impermissible comman-
deering by federal government where Congress forces state to take affirmative
action).
113. See id. (explaining that Congress may entice states to act in certain ways,
but cannot coerce states into acting as it did in this case).
114. See id. at 187–88 (explaining that there are constitutional methods of
achieving self-sufficiency in radioactive waste disposal, such as withholding incen-
tives to states as means of encouraging them to adopt regulatory schemes, but
forcing states to take title to waste is not one of them).
115. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
116. See id. at 902 (providing second classic example of impermissible com-
mandeering by federal government where Congress forces state to take affirmative
action).
15
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ter or enforce a federal regulatory program.117  In other words,
under Printz, Congress cannot circumvent the prohibition set forth
in New York by enlisting state officials to carry out a regulatory
program.118
Both of these cases represent the greater constitutional princi-
ple that the federal government cannot shield itself from a poten-
tially negative voter response by coercing states into carrying out
the programs it wants to implement.119  If not for this principle,
state officials would be subject to negative voter reaction for unpop-
ular decisions they had no role in making.120  Together, New York
and Printz establish the principle that states alone are responsible
for state policy and that Congress cannot force the states, or any of
the states’ officers, into service at the expense of the states.121  Ulti-
mately, the anti-commandeering doctrine is a constitutional safe-
guard that protects states against an overpowering federal
government seeking to undermine the political process.122
The Supreme Court will address this anti-commandeering
framework again when it reviews the Third Circuit’s holding in
Christie II en banc.123  In this case, New Jersey argued that PASPA
violates the anti-commandeering doctrine because it involves fed-
eral legislation forcing states to carry out the federal government’s
anti-gambling program.124 The court rejected New Jersey’s argu-
117. See id. at 933–34 (distinguishing facts from New York v. United States and
explaining that Congress cannot take away states’ sovereignty, even when no poli-
cymaking is involved).
118. Id. at 935 (“It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-
by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fun-
damentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”).
119. See generally id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182–83 (providing
one main point of constitutional reasoning behind general disfavor of comman-
deering by federal government).
120. See Jonathan Wood & Ilya Shapiro, Christie v. NCAA: Anti-Commandeering
or Bust, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Nov. 10, 2017), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publi-
cations/christie-v-ncaa-anti-commandeering-or-bust [https://perma.cc/C3TY-
ZASQ] (“Commandeering also undermines the political process by obscuring the
officials who are responsible for a given policy.”).
121. See id. (stating that PASPA is violation of anti-commandeering because it
dictates to New Jersey what its laws must be, thus preventing New Jersey from de-
ciding its own policy).
122. See id. (“By preserving political accountability, the anti-commandeering
principle aligns government with the preferences of the governed and creates in-
centives for states to find better, smarter ways to promote the public interest, with-
out necessarily favoring more or less government.”).
123. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27,
2017) (granting certiorari to New Jersey).
124. Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d 389, 399–402 (3d Cir. 2016) (drawing com-
parison to federal government forcing states to take title to waste in New York and
federal government forcing states to do background checks on gun purchasers in
16
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ment that unless PASPA provides for options beyond a complete
repeal or a complete ban on sports wagering, it violates the anti-
commandeering doctrine because it prohibits states from creating
their own policy.125
The court distinguished PASPA from the law struck down by
the Supreme Court in New York by stating that the law in that case
required the state to take action.126  The court held that because of
this distinction, PASPA is not coercive in nature and does not un-
constitutionally commandeer the states.127  New Jersey unsuccess-
fully argued that PASPA did require affirmative state action because
it forced the state to maintain the laws it already had banning sports
gambling.128
This distinction is one that raises a major constitutional ques-
tion.129  The Supreme Court will have to address the issue of what
exactly New York and Printz represent.130  One possibility is for the
Court to hold that New York and Printz represent the principle that
the federal government cannot force states to use their own re-
sources to carry out a federal program.131  If the Court takes this
route, PASPA could be upheld as constitutional because it does not
Printz in sense that PASPA effectively prohibits New Jersey legislature from imple-
menting sports gambling program as it sees fit within its borders), cert. granted sub
nom. Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27, 2017).
125. See id. (deeming argument too broad in sense that not all partial repeals
are created equal).
126. See id. at 402 (referring to requirements to take title to radioactive waste
and perform background checks for firearm purchases forced on states by
Congress).
127. See id. at 402 (“We reject the notion that PASPA presents states with a
coercive binary choice or affirmative command and conclude, as we did in Christie
I, that it does not unconstitutionally commandeer the states.”).
128. See id. at 393 (arguing that Congress was effectively coercing states by
forcing them to retain bans on sports gambling).
129. See Amy Howe, The 10th Amendment, Anti-Commandeering and Sports Betting:
In Plain English, SCOTUS BLOG (Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2017/08/10th-amendment-anti-commandeering-sports-betting-plain-english/
[https://perma.cc/BK25-TUMN] (distinguishing well-understood principle that
federal government cannot “commandeer” state to enforce federal law from
PASPA which is prohibitive in nature).
130. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). New York and Printz could either be inter-
preted narrowly to deem Congress’s prohibition of a repeal constitutional, or
broadly to deem Congress’s prohibition of a repeal unconstitutional. See infra
notes 131–134 and accompanying text. R
131. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 174 (“A State whose citizens do
not wish it to attain the Act’s milestones may devote its attention and its resources
to issues its citizens deem more worthy; the choice remains at all time with the
residents of the State, not with Congress.”).
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force states to take any affirmative action through the use of state
resources.132
Another possibility is for the Court to hold that the federal gov-
ernment cannot coerce state legislatures to govern pursuant to a
federal agenda in any way, regardless of whether such coercion is
affirmative or prohibitive in nature.133  This principle is embodied
in then-New Jersey governor Chris Christie’s quote that PASPA is
“dramatic, unprecedented, and in direct conflict with the Court’s
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence barring Congress from control-
ling how the States regulate private parties.”134
The Court should overturn the decision of the Third Circuit
because it effectively allows Congress to dictate to New Jersey what
its laws must be.135  This violates the anti-commandeering doctrine
because it contradicts the constitutional principles of federalism
and shields elected officials from political accountability at the fed-
eral level.136  Rather than instituting a federal ban, PASPA forbids
states from authorizing sports gambling.137  In 1932, Justice Louis
Brandeis delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann138 and famously stated that the “[d]enial of the
right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”139  If PASPA is upheld, it would
deter states from taking the experimental risks identified by the
132. See Howe, supra note 129 (serving as narrow interpretation of anti-com- R
mandeering doctrine on spectrum of constitutionally prohibited acts by federal
government).
133. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 920–21 (“[T]he Framers rejected the concept of a
central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead de-
signed a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise con-
current authority over the people.”).
134. Howe, supra note 129 (quoting Chris Christie). R
135. See Jonathan Wood, Symposium: In Sports-Betting Case, the Supreme Court
Should Bet on Federalism, SCOTUS BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2017/08/symposium-sports-betting-case-supreme-court-bet-federalism/
[https://perma.cc/T77Y-RD94] (outlining history of New Jersey’s challenge to
PASPA and issues to be addressed by Supreme Court).
136. See id. (“PASPA also undermines traditional federalism principles by de-
nying states the ability to experiment with novel solutions to vexing public policy
problems.”).
137. See id. (highlighting fact that institution of federal ban on sports gam-
bling would have been politically unpopular with Nevada due to establish sports
gambling industry in Las Vegas).
138. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
139. Id. at 311.
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Court in New State Ice, which provide tremendous benefits to the
entire nation.140
2. Equal Sovereignty Among the States
The doctrine of equal sovereignty is based on the principle
that all states are offered equal power and authority with respect to
one another.141  The most recent case to reach the Supreme Court
regarding equal sovereignty is Shelby County v. Holder.142  There is
much debate among Supreme Court Justices about whether the
Constitution actually requires equal sovereignty among states.143
The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts in Shelby
County states, “not only do States retain sovereignty under the Con-
stitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of equal sover-
eignty’ among the States.”144  Critics of this opinion describe the
holding as a conclusion drawn by the majority with little support.145
In striking down a law related to the regulation of elections, the
Court in Shelby County argued that the power to regulate elections is
granted heightened protection because it was something the Fram-
ers specifically emphasized as belonging to the states.146  But this
140. See Wood, supra note 135 (explaining that if PASPA is upheld it would R
give Congress power to pass laws similar to PASPA that forbid states from repealing
their own laws even if laws turn out to be expensive, ineffective, or politically
unpopular).
141. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65
DUKE L.J. 1087, 1089 (2016) (discussing equal sovereignty). But see id. at 1090
(noting on contrary that some constitutional experts, including Judge Richard Pos-
ner and Justice Ginsburg, argue there is no equal sovereignty doctrine in U.S.
Constitution).
142. 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down portion of Voting Rights Act of 1965
because of restrictions placed on some states and not others).
143. See Colby, supra note 141, at 1089 (mentioning sharp 5-4 split among R
justices in Shelby Cty. decision as evidence of this fact, with Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Alito joining in majority opinion, Justice Thomas concurring, and
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissenting).
144. See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. 544 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
145. See id. at 588 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Today’s unprecedented extension
of the equal sovereignty principle outside its proper domain–the admission of new
States–is capable of much mischief.  Federal statutes that treat States disparately
are hardly novelties.”); Colby, supra note 141, at 1089 (pointing out widespread R
criticism of opinion from both left and right and surprising lack of support for
decision given important status of case).
146. See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 546 (“More specifically, ‘the Framers of the
Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.’”) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 461–62 (1991); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
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aspect of the holding also has its critics.147 One professor argues
that “statutes like PASPA are constitutionally questionable” given
the holding in Shelby County.148
In Christie I, New Jersey argued that Nevada, which has the least
restrictive sports gambling environment in the United States, re-
ceives preferential treatment under PASPA with respect to other
states in violation of the equal sovereignty doctrine.149  The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this argument, and
though it acknowledged the similarities between PASPA and the law
struck down in Shelby County with regard to equal sovereignty, it
pointed out that the Court in Shelby County recognized heightened
constitutional protection for election law.150
3. Standing and Harm to the Plaintiff
In order to bring any legal proceeding, a plaintiff must have
standing.151  This means a plaintiff must show that he suffered ac-
tual harm from the violation of a legally protected interest, that the
harm is traceable to actions of the defendant, and that a favorable
ruling by a court would redress the injury.152
In Christie I, New Jersey argued that the sports leagues lacked
standing to bring suit in court.153  The leagues argued they would
suffer harm from legal sports gambling because of the negative per-
ception associated with an inevitable increase in match fixing.154
New Jersey asserted that the leagues’ claim regarding negative pub-
lic perception was speculative and that the leagues failed to show
147. See Rodenberg & Holden, supra note 68, at 2 (explaining Justice Gins- R
burg’s dissenting opinion in Shelby Cty that raised question as to whether PASPA
would “remain safe given Court’s expansion of equal sovereignty’s sway”).
148. Id. (quoting Colby, supra note 141, at 1091). R
149. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 237–39 (3d Cir. 2013) (referring to fact that
Nevada is only state lawfully operating virtually unrestricted sports betting
schemes).
150. See id. at 238 (distinguishing between PASPA and election law addressed
in Shelby Cty in that Shelby Cty represented “an uncommon exercise of congressional
power” because “the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for
themselves . . . the power to regulate elections.”) (quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at
546).
151. See, e.g., Standing, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFORMATION INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/standing [https://perma.cc/44KV-4B39] (last visited
Mar. 3, 2018) (explaining requirement for obtaining favorable judgment in court
apart from substantive merits of legal claim).
152. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
153. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 218 (basing argument on fact that leagues suffer
no harm from legalization of sports gambling in New Jersey).
154. See id. (claiming fans naturally suspect players to have hidden financial
motives to fix games when sports gambling is legal).
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any harm from an increase in legalized sports betting.155  The trial
court relied on OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell to reject New Jersey’s
argument, holding that “reputational injury is a legally cognizable
harm that may confer standing.”156  Additionally, the trial court
stated that there were sufficient facts in the record to support the
leagues’ claims and withstand New Jersey’s argument that the harm
was speculative.157
The court also addressed the leagues’ claim that they would
become the object of state-licensed gambling and suffer reputa-
tional harm if New Jersey was permitted to legalize sports gam-
bling.158  It held that there was sufficient evidence that legalizing
sports gambling is linked to increased incentives for match fix-
ing.159  The court came to this conclusion partly based on a report
by the National Gambling Impact Study Commission prepared at
Congress’s request explaining that athletes are “often tempted to
bet on contests in which they participate, undermining the integrity
of sporting contests.”160  As such, the court rejected New Jersey’s
argument that the gambling activities of unknown third parties
could not cause injury to the leagues.161  The court referred to the
leagues’ argument for standing as a “straightforward conclusion,
particularly given the stigmatizing effect of having sporting contests
associated with gambling, a link that is confirmed by commonsense
and Congress’ own conclusions.”162
155. See id. (emphasizing word “legalized” to imply that legalization would
create no risk for additional negative perception because it would shift sports gam-
bling from illegal channels to legal, regulated markets without increasing total
amount of gambling).
156. Id. (discussing trial court’s reasoning); see also OFC Comm Baseball v.
Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 302 (3d Cir. 2009) (blocking Delaware from expanding
currently-existing sports gambling scheme).
157. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 220–22 (concluding that record indicated that
potential for reputational harm to leagues was more than mere speculation, refer-
ring to fact that Congress also reached conclusion that there is link between legal-
izing sports gambling and harm to integrity of professional sports when it passed
laws addressing gambling and sports, and citing studies presented in court “show-
ing that: (1) some fans from each league viewed gambling as a problem area for
leagues . . . ; (2) some fans did not want a professional sports franchise to open in
Las Vegas . . . ; and (3) a large number of fans oppose expansion of legalized
sports betting”).
158. See id. at 219 (stating that legalization would permit New Jersey to profit
off of leagues’ product).
159. See id. at 221 (noting that Congress reached same conclusion when it
passed PASPA).
160. Id. (quoting 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission).
161. See id. at 222 (comparing claim to libel and breach of contract in sense
that judicially rectifiable claims can exist where harm is brought upon plaintiff
through reaction of third parties).
162. Id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
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4. Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause
According to the Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution gives Congress “considerabl[e] . . . latitude in regulat-
ing conduct and transactions.”163  The Commerce Clause grants
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”164  At its
core, it allows Congress to regulate activity that “substantially affects
interstate commerce” if the activity “arise[s] out of or is connected
with a commercial transaction.”165  Importantly, regulation of such
activity is disfavored if it is not considered economic in nature.166
As a threshold matter, the court in Christie I was forced to ad-
dress whether Congress had the authority to enact PASPA under
the Commerce Clause.167  In its analysis, it held that gambling on
sports is an economic, financial transaction and leagues are inher-
ently economic because they operate as for-profit entertainment
businesses.168  Therefore, according to the court, because the
leagues are inherently economic and their organizations generate
revenue throughout the nation, the leagues’ operations “substan-
tially affect” interstate commerce.169  In addition, the court relied
on precedent and cited United States v. Riehl,170 which stated “gam-
bling involves the use and has an effect upon interstate
commerce.”171
New Jersey proceeded to argue that PASPA is unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause because it “reaches unlimited betting
activity that cannot possibly affect interstate commerce” by prohibit-
ing gambling that is completely intrastate in nature such as wagers
163. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 608 (2000)).
164. U.S. CONST., art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
165. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 224 (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
166. See id. at 224 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567) (claiming Congress does not
have authority under Commerce Clause to prohibit weapon possession near
schools because it is non-economic activity); see also id. (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at
613) (claiming Congress does not have authority under Commerce Clause to enact
law prohibiting violence against women because it is non-economic activity).
167. See id. at 224–26 (addressing Commerce Clause argument and implying
this is relatively weak argument by New Jersey).
168. See id. at 225 (citing fact that National Football League describes itself as
“complex business model that includes a diverse range of revenue streams, which
contribute . . . to company profitability).
169. See id. (“[T]here can be no serious dispute that the professional and am-
ateur sporting events at the heart of the Leagues’ operations “substantially affect”
interstate commerce.”).
170. 460 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972).
171. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 225 (quoting Riehl, 460 F.2d at 458).
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between friends or family members.172  The Court swiftly dismissed
this argument pointing to the fact that PASPA addresses gambling
“schemes” carried out “pursuant to law or compact.”173  According
to the court, examples of casual betting among friends or family are
not prohibited by PASPA, as PASPA only prohibits “systematic
plan[s]” carried out pursuant to state law.174  The court also articu-
lated that even if such activity is regulated under PASPA, it would
not violate the Commerce Clause because Congress had a “rational
basis for concluding that the activity in the aggregate has a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.”175  Ultimately, the court con-
cluded that PASPA is not unconstitutional in any way with respect
to the power given to Congress by the Commerce Clause.176
B. PASPA’s Failure from a Policy Perspective
PASPA harms states because it strips them of the opportunity
to increase economic output on the back of the sports gambling
industry.177  It has failed to adequately protect consumers by ena-
bling a shift from controlled, regulated betting environments to a
massive underground illegal market.178  Protecting the integrity of
sporting events and monitoring the mental health of bettors is en-
cumbered by PASPA because it prohibits the implementation of
technological safeguards in the industry.179  PASPA is also unneces-
172. Id. at 225 (quoting Brief of Appellant New Jersey Thoroughbred Horse-
men’s Ass’n at 34, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (No. 13-1714)).
173. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3702).
174. Id. at 225 (quoting Scheme, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)) (re-
jecting New Jersey’s interpretation of PASPA that Congress is regulating all “com-
petitive games” involving “amateur or professional athletes”).
175. Id. at 226 (citing Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19–20 (2005)) (explain-
ing holding in prominent Supreme Court Commerce Clause case in which Court
held that Congress had power under Commerce Clause to regulate wheat produc-
tion even when activity was intrastate in character because interstate market for
wheat was substantially affected in aggregate).
176. See id. at 215 (highlighting weakness in New Jersey’s Commerce Clause
argument in that it did not raise any significantly problematic legal issues and was
not highly compelling).
177. See infra notes 181–199 and accompanying text (referring to tax reve- R
nues, job creation, and attracting tourists as ways to increase economic output).
178. See infra notes 200–215 and accompanying text (arguing that PASPA’s R
unintended consequences have caused harm to consumers in sports gambling in-
dustry by forcing them to transact with illegal organizations in uncontrolled
environments).
179. See infra notes 216–228 and accompanying text (discussing use of techno- R
logical safeguards to track suspicious betting activity and monitor bettors for un-
healthy tendencies).
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sary because a majority of Americans now perceive sports gambling
to be a morally acceptable activity.180
1. The Opportunity Cost of PASPA
According to the State of New Jersey, “sports betting in the
United States . . . is a $500 billion per year industry,” but most of
the activity occurs illegally.181  According to the American Sports
Betting Coalition, $56 billion of the $58 billion that will be wagered
on the 2017–2018 NFL season will be done so illegally.182  Since
1992, when states could no longer decide to legalize sports gam-
bling under PASPA, most of the revenue generated from this indus-
try has been funneled to organized crime and offshore websites.183
Legalizing sports gambling and “creating a regulated market for
sports betting would create up to $26.6 billion in annual economic
impact.”184  Legalization could also lead to the creation of an esti-
mated 152,000 jobs in the United States.185  These jobs could pay
total wages of $7.5 billion annually to employees.186  The United
Kingdom, for example, benefits from employing over 100,000 peo-
ple in the sports gambling industry.187  Sports gambling allows the
180. See infra notes 229–238 and accompanying text (noting major shift from R
1992 when PASPA was enacted).
181. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 215 (stating New Jersey’s argument that PASPA is
ineffective because it led to increased amount of sports gambling and shift to ille-
gal markets rather than reduction in sports gambling).
182. See AM. SPORTS BETTING COALITION, supra note 54 (making argument R
that Americans are not responding to PASPA by refraining from sports gambling,
but instead placing bets in unregulated, underground environment).
183. See Andrew Vacca, Comment, Sports Betting: Why the United States Should Go
All In, 11 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (2014) (implying correlation between enact-
ment of PASPA and increase in illegal gambling entities due to lack of government
regulation).
184. Stacy Papadopoulos, Symposium: Lift the Harmful, Failing Federal Ban on
Sports Betting (Corrected), SCOTUS BLOG (Aug. 15, 2017, 2:26 PM), http://www
.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-lift-harmful-failing-federal-ban-sports-bet-
ting/ [https://perma.cc/B86R-7WV4] (accounting for overall impact of legal
sports gambling such as increased tourism, not just revenues generated directly
from betting).
185. See Jonathan D. Salant, Casino Industry Launches Campaign to Legalize Sports
Betting, NJ.COM (June 13, 2017), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/06/
casino_industry_launches_effort_to_legalize_sports.html [https://perma.cc/
UWR2-2QGQ] (citing statistics from American Sports Betting Coalition).
186. See Papadopoulos, supra note 184 (providing economic benefit directly R
to citizens beyond potential increase in tax revenues generated from sports
gambling).
187. See Zach Schreiber, supra note 36, at 374 (explaining one aspect of suc- R
cess of British model for legalization of sports gambling).
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United Kingdom to generate more than $7 billion in annual gross
domestic product.188
Some communities in the United States pay millions of dollars
to finance projects for the creation of new stadiums for sports teams
in hopes that these venues will generate revenue by attracting ma-
jor events.189  If sports gambling was legal, revenue from betting
could be used to aid in the financing of these sports-related projects
that benefit communities.190  The Oakland Raiders’ move to Las
Vegas is one example of such a project.191  When discussions of the
Raiders’ possible relocation began, politicians and businesses were
eager to see the move come to fruition because of the benefits that
accompany the presence of a prominent professional sports
franchise.192  As part of the deal, Raiders owner Mark Davis and
investor Sheldon Adelson would only commit $1.15 billion of the
nearly $2 billion necessary for the construction of the new sta-
dium.193  In situations like these, it makes sense to allow states and
cities to recoup the public funding used to close these financing
gaps by capitalizing on sports gambling, which would create reve-
nue directly in addition to supplementing non-gaming revenues in-
directly by serving as an additional draw for customers.194  If sports
188. See id. (arguing this serves as further evidence that legal sports gambling
creates major economic benefits).
189. See Jonathan Crowl, Politicians, Experts Emphasize Multiple Benefits of Legal-
ized Sports Gambling, THE POST GAME (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.thepostgame
.com/blog/spread-sheet/201502/politicians-experts-focus-multiple-benefits-legal-
ized-sports-gambling [https://perma.cc/42SE-6WXY] (giving example of Minne-
apolis, which spent $150 million, along with $348 million of Minnesota state
funding, for $1 billion venue for Minnesota Vikings that won bids to host 2018
Super Bowl and 2019 men’s Final Four).
190. See id. (providing example of areas directly related to sports and gaming
industry that could benefit economically from legalized sports gambling).
191. See Brittany Bronson, Politicians Place a Bet on a Stadium, and Vegas Pays for
It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/07/opinion/pol-
iticians-place-a-bet-on-a-stadium-and-vegas-pays-for-it.html (detailing mixed public
opinion about whether potential economic impact of Raiders’ presence justifies
use of approximately $750 million in public funding).
192. See id. (noting relocation supporters’ claims that stadium could produce
up to $800 million in new economic activity per year).
193. See id. (explaining that remaining balance would be supplemented
through public funding by increased tax on hotel rooms).
194. Cf. Brett L.L. Abarbanel, Estimating the Indirect Contribution of Sports Books:
Sports Wagering as a Driver of Other In-House Revenues, U. NEV., LAS VEGAS, C. HOTEL
ADMIN. (2009), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.885.50
28&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/N75S-FCWS] (discussing relationship
between revenues generated by sports gambling and overall revenue of casinos by
pointing to fact that sports gamblers often use winnings from bets on other ameni-
ties within casino).
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gambling was not legal in Nevada, it is unlikely that the Raiders’
relocation would have been feasible for the city of Las Vegas.195
Legalization could also help in places like New Jersey, where
sports gambling legislation has been introduced in an effort to revi-
talize Atlantic City’s once-thriving casino industry.196  Striking down
PASPA could generate up to $173 million in revenue and create
thousands of new jobs for New Jersey.197  One politician in Atlantic
City stated, “[i]t’s my sincere hope that the Supreme Court will rule
in our favor to finally legalize sports betting here in New Jersey . . . .
Having sports betting will be another tool in our arsenal to attract
more visitors and revenue to Atlantic City.”198  Many feel that New
Jersey is unduly burdened by PASPA because of the revenue-gener-
ating opportunities it misses out on despite being better prepared
to handle sports gambling than other states due to its existing ca-
sino gaming infrastructure.199
2. A Counterproductive Effect on Consumer Protection
Many of the issues PASPA attempts to eradicate could be dealt
with more efficiently through the use of technological safeguards
that only exist in legalized markets.200  In this sense, the legalization
of sports gambling in the United States would lead to more protec-
tion for consumers because it would create transparency in the
gambling market.201  Brad Schimel, Attorney General of Wisconsin,
195. See Bronson, supra note 191 (comparing Las Vegas to St. Louis, which R
still owes approximately $144 million on Rams’ stadium despite fact that team left
city, and San Diego, which is still in debt from 1997 renovation of Chargers’
stadium).
196. See Salant, supra note 185 (providing another example of how sports R
gambling could serve to promote goals of many communities).
197. See Jessica Gresko & Nicholas Huba, Court Suggests it May Side with New
Jersey in Sports Betting Case, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.pres-
sofatlanticcity.com/news/press/casinos_tourism/court-suggests-it-may-side-with-
new-jersey-in-sports/article_1561694f-661e-56a2-a131-915c13b8246e.html [https:/
/perma.cc/BK39-669W] (“If the PASPA ban is struck down, New Jersey is expected
to generate more than $173 million in additional tax revenue and see the creation
of more than 3,633 jobs, according to a study from Oxford Economics.”).
198. Id. (quoting Assemblyman Vince Mazzeo, D-Atlantic County).
199. See id. (quoting Assemblyman Chris Brown of Atlantic County, “[a]t a
time when we are revitalizing Atlantic City and hundreds of millions of dollars are
leaving the state on sports betting, the federal ban is only punishing New Jersey
residents”).
200. See Furman, supra note 56, at 118 (discussing benefits of repealing R
PASPA).
201. See Michelle Minton, Law Enforcement Joins Coalition to End Sports Gambling
Ban, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (June 13, 2017), https://cei.org/blog/law-en-
forcement-joins-coalition-end-sports-gambling-ban [https://perma.cc/DP8R-
6Q52] (explaining American Gaming Association’s reasoning behind new coali-
tion to end ban on sports betting).
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stated  “[t]he rampant illegal sports betting that currently exists
continues to fuel other activities and provides no consumer
protections.”202
Increased transparency from legalization would allow law en-
forcement to focus more resources on other important areas of
concern.203  According to one former FBI Director, “a regulated
market combined with modern data analytics technology makes it
easier to track sports wagering, identify suspicious and anomalous
betting patterns, and strengthen the integrity of games.”204  For ex-
ample, blockchain technology, which is used by cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin and allows data to be distributed without being copied,
can be used in the sports gambling industry to increase regulatory
transparency and provide secure systems for bettor payouts.205  Sev-
eral companies using blockchain technology already exist and have
expressed interest in capturing the market for legal sports
gambling.206
In the United Kingdom, legitimate companies take bets on va-
rious sporting events and set odds based on the likelihood of possi-
ble outcomes for each game.207  Under this system, consumers are
better protected from fraudulent activities such as match-fixing,
line-altering, and other illegal conduct because the operations are
overseen by the companies themselves along with official gaming
commissions created to protect the integrity of the operations.208
202. Id. (quoting Schimel).
203. See id. (insinuating shift in focus towards things such as violent crime
from activities involving consensual transactions among adults would be more
efficient).
204. Ed Davis et al., The Federal Sports Betting Ban Has Failed: Let’s Legalize and
Regulate It, THE HILL (June 12, 2017, 9:40 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/con-
gress-blog/politics/337367-the-federal-sports-betting-ban-has-failed-lets-legalize-
and [https://perma.cc/F27E-F5RL] (citing opinion of Tim Murphy, co-author of
article and former FBI deputy director).
205. See Revolutionizing Sports Betting by Harnessing the Power of Blockchain Tech-
nology, PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 13, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/revolutionizing-sports-betting-by-harnessing-the-power-of-
blockchain-technology-663884093.html [https://perma.cc/6DGJ-UZ7E] (explain-
ing that blockchain uses database of encrypted transactions in form of blocks ar-
ranged in chains to make transactions immutable, which can be used to create
secure, trusted payment platforms for sports gambling market).
206. See id. (referring to publicly traded companies such as BTL Group, Riot
Blockchain, NetCents Technology, and Leeta Gold Corp. currently utilizing
blockchain technologies).
207. See Schreiber, supra note 36, at 375 (explaining how legalized, legitimate R
sports gambling creates safer environment for bettors).
208. See id. (explaining why betting companies share information with each
other and how U.K. Gambling Commission protects bettors from cheating and
other fraudulent activities).
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In 2007, a British sports gambling company that utilizes these
safeguards stated that on one occasion it “noticed irregular betting
patterns of a professional tennis match in Europe, prompting a sub-
sequent investigation by the Association of Tennis Professionals,”
which is an example of how legalization and regulation can help
prevent fraudulent activity.209  The sports gambling industry in the
United Kingdom also shows that legalization protects consumers by
creating an environment of cooperation between the government
and private companies in the industry.210  This cooperation is mu-
tually beneficial because governments have an interest in rooting
out organized crime and private companies rely on their reputa-
tional integrity for financial success.211
Throughout the United States, the lack of transparency be-
tween state governments and unlawful gambling operations creates
significant problems.212  Domestically, those who choose to bet ille-
gally are often cheated out of their winnings.213  Revenues from ille-
gal gambling are also used to finance other organized crime
activity.214  One professor and criminologist argues that while indi-
viduals placing bets may be a harmless activity, illegal gambling op-
erations actually support organized crime activities that victimize
others.215
3. Sports Gambling as a Social Concern
One major concern that many opponents of legalized sports
gambling have is that lifting the restrictions on sports gambling
209. Id. (quoting Woo, supra note 19, at 593). R
210. See id. at 376 (stating private sports gambling companies in United King-
dom are required to report suspicious betting activity to government which helps
government control organized crime).
211. See id. (exemplifying how, in legal betting markets, critical bond between
government and private organizations helps establish safe betting environment).
212. See JAY S. ALBANESE, VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., ILLEGAL GAMBLING & OR-
GANIZED CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL CONVICTIONS IN 2014 1 (2015), https://gal
lery.mailchimp.com/03373c05c46b5e9a6eb445537/files/Albanese_Illegal_Gamb
ling_OC_Report_2014_cases_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2SY-Z8TP] (show-
ing that betting is not inherently problematic, but gambling-related issues by or-
ganized crime do exist in markets where sports gambling is illegal).
213. See id. at 1–2 (providing examples of how PASPA removes protections for
consumers of sports gambling rather than decreasing access).
214. See id. at 1 (stating example of negative effects beyond sports gambling
industry fueled by PASPA-created underground market for betting).
215. See ALBANESE, supra note 212, at 1 (stating that illegalization empowers R
organized crime members to allocate betting profits to harmful activities, which
could be avoided if states could combat organized crime involvement in sports
gambling with regulations).
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would lead to negative effects on society.216  In the eyes of one for-
mer federal prosecutor, “[f]or the two-thirds of Americans who
rarely or never engage in commercial gambling, the [legalization of
sports gambling] will be negative . . . . Anyone fairly and compre-
hensively evaluating the unbiased, independent academic health-
care and economic evidence readily finds that it weighs in favor of
continuing prohibitions . . . .”217  A clinical psychologist at the Uni-
versity of Sydney Gambling Treatment Clinic in Australia referred
to the legalization of sports gambling in Australia as “gamblization”
and noted an increase in the number of negatively-impacted sports
bettors since sports gambling became legal.218  According to Austra-
lian Gambling Statistics, Australians lost nearly $815 million of the
$7.1 billion they bet on sports in 2014 and 2015.219  Some oppo-
nents of sports gambling legalization see that as a sign that addic-
tion has become a problem.220
Another issue raised by opponents of sports gambling legaliza-
tion is the increased likelihood of match-fixing.221  Former NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue was one of the primary forces behind
the argument that gambling causes corruption in sports and threat-
ens the integrity of the games.222  In his September 1991 congres-
sional testimony, he stated “sports gambling threatens the integrity
of, and public confidence in, team sports.  Sports lotteries inevitably
foster a climate of suspicion about controversial plays and intensify
cynicism with respect to player performances, coaching decisions,
officiating calls and game results.”223
216. See, e.g., David Purdum & Ryan Rodenberg, Future of Sports Betting: The
Pitfalls, ESPN (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/17910253/
the-future-sports-betting-go-wrong-sports-betting-was-legal-united-states [https://
perma.cc/EU74-4EPS] (pointing to instances of addiction to sports gambling and
media’s coverage of betting odds in places like Australia).
217. Id. (quoting former federal prosecutor Michel K. Fagan).
218. See id. (citing Dr. Christopher Hunt, who recalled seeing only “one or
two” troubled sports bettors every six months prior to legalization of sports gam-
bling in Australia but noticed increase subsequent to legalization).
219. See id. (noting increase from previous year).
220. See id. (arguing that this is evidence that sports gambling spiraled out of
control once it was legalized).
221. See Fielkow et al., supra note 48, at 30 (presenting most widely-used argu- R
ment by proponents of PASPA in favor of retaining ban on sports betting).
222. See id. (showing influence of NFL on climate of sports gambling in
United States).
223. Id. (quoting Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S. 473
and S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1992) (statement of Paul Tagliabue)).
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However, legalizing sports gambling would actually have a posi-
tive effect on the integrity of sports.224  Modern technological safe-
guards, which could be utilized if sports gambling was legalized and
properly regulated, could help to monitor unusual betting activities
and identify people with gambling problems.225  In countries that
permit sports gambling, match fixing “scandals [are] more readily
exposed and violators” are more easily punished due to increased
regulation.226  In countries like China and India, where match fix-
ing and corruption is rampant, all forms of sports gambling are ille-
gal.227  Several soccer leagues in countries that ban sports gambling
such as Singapore, Malaysia, and China have collapsed due to loss
of sponsorships triggered by instances of match fixing.228
4. Changing Moral Views Surrounding Sports Gambling
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report recommending the
passage of PASPA stated that the Act “serves an important public
purpose, to stop the spread of State-sponsored gambling and to
maintain the integrity of our national pastime.”229  It further ar-
gued that the threat of expanding sports wagering is “un-
dermin[ing] public confidence in the character of professional and
amateur sports” and “promot[ing] gambling among our Nation’s
young people.”230  Again addressing the moral aspect of sports gam-
bling, the report states:
224. See id. at 47–48 (noting NBA Commissioner Adam Silver’s stance that
environment surrounding sports betting has changed since enactment of PASPA).
225. See id. at 47 (serving as evidence that legalization actually helps promote
intended goals of PASPA and eradicates issues presented by proponents of
PASPA).
226. STEPHEN F. ROSS ET AL., PENN STATE INST. FOR SPORTS L., POL’Y AND RES.,
Reform of Sports Gambling in the United States: Lessons from Down Under 2, https://
pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/White%20Paper%20%28web%20draft%
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN64-VQYU] (explaining that not all countries choose
to protect integrity of sports by banning sports gambling because legalization can
lead to more stringent oversight); see also Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d 389, 265 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[PASPA] has also been criticized for encouraging the spread of illegal
sports gambling and for making it easier to fix games, since it precludes the trans-
parency that accompanies legal activities.”), cert. granted sub nom. Christie v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27, 2017).
227. See STEPHEN F. ROSS ET AL., supra note 226, at 2 (making point that out- R
lawing sports gambling completely does not necessarily serve to protect integrity of
sports and prevent match fixing).
228. See id. (citation omitted) (referring to instances of Pirelli and China Cen-
tral TV backing out of sponsorship deals for soccer leagues).
229. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4 (1992).
230. Id.
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[PASPA] represents a judgement that sports gambling . . .
is a problem of legitimate Federal concern for which a
Federal solution is warranted.  We must do everything we
can to keep sports clean so that the fans, and especially
young people, can continue to have complete confidence
in the honesty of the players and the contests.231
One instance highlighting the issue of integrity in sports gam-
bling is the NBA’s Tim Donaghy Scandal of 2007.232  Donaghy
plead guilty to participation in a gambling scheme in which he ac-
cepted money from gamblers in exchange for secret information
on games that he refereed.233  As a result, a major issue of fan skep-
ticism surrounding the integrity of sporting events developed.234
Today, American attitudes regarding the morality of sports
gambling are more positive.235  At the time PASPA was introduced
in Congress, many people saw sports gambling as an inherently im-
moral activity.236  Now, nearly two-thirds of Americans believe that
it is not immoral to gamble on sports.237  This sentiment was ex-
pressed by NBA Commissioner Adam Silver when he stated that
sports gambling “has increasingly become a popular and accepted
form of entertainment.”238
231. Id.
232. See Mike Fish, Donaghy Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison in Gambling Scan-
dal, ESPN (July 30, 2008), http://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=3509440
[https://perma.cc/4NMZ-DWZ9] (showing effects of rigged NBA games on confi-
dence of people who watch games).
233. See id. (mentioning Donaghy’s statement to U.S. District Judge that he
“brought shame on himself, his family and the profession”).
234. See id. (explaining one University of Pennsylvania professor’s quote that
“any fan who sees anything other than transparency will have questions”).
235. See, e.g., Rodenberg & Holden, supra note 68, at 8 (changing from previ- R
ously negative perception shown by PASPA’s 1991 Senate Report referring to
sports gambling as “national problem”); see also Christie II en banc, 832 F.3d 389, 395
(3d Cir. 2016) (“PASPA is not without its critics, even aside from its economic
impact. It has been criticized for prohibiting an activity, i.e., sports gambling, that
its critics view as neither immoral nor dangerous.”), cert. granted sub nom. Christie v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (June 27, 2017).
236. See Rodenberg & Holden, supra note 68, at 8 (citing PASPA’s 1991 Sen- R
ate Report referring to moral erosion caused by sports gambling).
237. See Lisa Cannon Green, Is Sports Gambling Moral? You Bet, Americans Say,
LIFEWAY RES. (Jan. 22, 2016), http://lifewayresearch.com/2016/01/22/is-sports-
gambling-moral-you-bet-americans-say/ [https://perma.cc/ES47-E362] (citing
new study about change in Americans’ beliefs regarding sports gambling).
238. See Amelia Curotto, Note, Hanging on by a “Tail”: New Jersey’s 2014 Effort to
Legalize Sports Gambling Stays Alive in the Third Circuit, 23 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS
L.J. 481, 506 (2016) (quoting Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-com-
missioner-adamsilver-legalize-sports-betting.html?_r=1) (referring to fact that
Americans are demanding more secure and legal ways to bet on sports).
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IV. CONCLUSION
New Jersey’s challenges to PASPA in the Christie cases exposed
significant issues related to the statutory interpretation and consti-
tutionality of PASPA.239  The use of the word “authorize” leaves
much room for interpretation within the statute.240
The anti-commandeering doctrine is also a major problem for
PASPA.241  The view that New York and Printz only prohibit Congress
from forcing states to use their own resources to carry out federal
programs is too narrow.242  The Supreme Court should strike down
PASPA because it effectively strips states of the power to legislate as
they see fit within their own borders.243
PASPA is also a failure from a policy perspective.244  A legal
sports gambling market would lead to tremendous economic bene-
fits.245  Not only would it generate tax revenue, but it would also
provide much-needed financial assistance for states by creating jobs
and increasing overall economic production.246
In terms of consumer protection, PASPA has failed because it
funnels money from legal, regulated schemes to illegal, corrupt or-
ganizations.247  Some of these organizations use profits generated
239. For a detailed discussion on the legal issues surrounding PASPA, see
supra notes 57–176 and accompanying text (explaining New Jersey’s attempt to R
partially repeal sports gambling laws and how lack of affirmative legalization cre-
ated issues about meaning of word “authorize” and 10th amendment).
240. See Wallach, supra note 58 (explaining New Jersey’s argument in Christie R
that “authorize” does not mean merely “to permit” or “to allow” but rather to af-
firmatively sanction something); see also supra notes 57–176 and accompanying text R
(including New Jersey’s argument in Christie that partial repeal of sports gambling
laws was effectively decriminalization, but not authorization, of activity).
241. For a detailed discussion of the anti-commandeering doctrine, see supra
notes 108–140 and accompanying text (discussing New York v. United States and R
Printz v. United States, two Supreme Court decisions that make up body of case law
for anti-commandeering doctrine).
242. See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text (comparing narrow in- R
terpretation that is unlikely to be accepted by Supreme Court to interpretation
asserted by New Jersey calling for broader view of holdings).
243. See supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text  (contradicting primary R
purpose of anti-commandeering doctrine, which is to protect states from coercion
by federal government and prohibit federal government from using state legisla-
tures as shields from negative voter response).
244. See supra notes 177–238 and accompanying text (discussing shortcom- R
ings and unintended negative consequences of PASPA).
245. See supra notes 181–199 (showing that not only could states generate tax R
revenue from sports gambling and provide boost to economies, legalization would
eradicate corruption and reduce levels of organized crime).
246. See Papadopoulos, supra note 184 (estimating $26.6 billion in annual eco- R
nomic impact nationally from legal sports gambling industry).
247. See Guy Bentley, Time to End the Failed Ban on Sports Betting, WASH. EXAM-
INER (June 15, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/time-to-end-the-
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from illegal schemes to fuel organized crime of greater concern to
the public than any sports gambling-related concerns.248  PASPA is
counterproductive because it prohibits the increased oversight and
regulation of sports gambling that would reduce the likelihood of
match fixing and scandals.249
The argument that there is a societal cost to legalizing sports
gambling is misguided.250  Many professional and amateur sports
leagues argue that legalization would lead to corruption in the
form of match fixing scandals and create a negative perception
about sports.251  Others argue that issues related to gambling addic-
tion would become more prevalent in society if the public is
granted easier access to betting.252  A comparison of illegal sports
gambling in the United States and legalized sports gambling in
other countries shows that neither is true.253
As history has shown, public perception on sports gambling
has fluctuated over time and is currently on an up-tick relative to
the 1990s when PASPA was enacted.254  Gambling is no longer per-
ceived as an immoral activity.255  This shift to a more positive public
failed-ban-on-sports-betting/article/2626063 [https://perma.cc/27FJ-U5LM]
(demonstrating that PASPA has failed in sense that it diverts billions of dollars to
organized crime and gives corrupt organizations power to manipulate industry
with no oversight).
248. See AM. GAMING ASS’N: ILLEGAL GAMBLING ADVISORY BOARD, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT SUMMIT ON ILLEGAL SPORTS BETTING: AFTER-ACTION REPORT 3 (2016),
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/After%20Action%20Report
_PDF-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RCZ-JFU4] (arguing that law enforcement
does not have enough information to combat organized crime related to sports
gambling without power to regulate, therefore funds are funneled to violent crime
instead of tax revenue for states).
249. See id. at 5–6 (showing that match fixing is attractive in illegal gambling
environments because of lack of oversight, but this corruption is reduced in legal-
ized environment due to elimination of market for illegal gambling).
250. See supra notes 216–228 and accompanying text (arguing legalization R
would not lead to increased likelihood of addiction to gambling and corruption
related to sporting events).
251. See, e.g., Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing these
arguments).
252. See Purdum & Rodenberg, supra note 216 (discussing issue of gambling R
addiction); see also supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text (using example of R
what some see as problems related to addiction in Australia to support claim).
253. For a detailed discussion on analysis of benefits compared to costs of
legalizing sports gambling, see supra notes 177–238 and accompanying text (find- R
ing mainly that PASPA has not succeeded in reducing levels of gambling on sport-
ing events, but instead led to unintended consequence of creating massive,
unregulated betting schemes operated illegally).
254. See Parry, supra note 52 (noting Americans’ increasingly positive views R
with respect to morality of gambling).
255. See id. (insinuating that because negative public perception played role
in PASPA’s enactment, positive public perception could play role in its repeal).
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perception should be used to garner support in opposition to
PASPA in the same way it was used to influence the enactment of
PASPA during a period of relatively negative perception.256
With PASPA in place, states are missing out on millions in reve-
nue and consumers are less safe because sports gambling is unregu-
lated.257  Legalization would shift the sports betting market to a
legal environment where states could provide better protection for
their citizens, fortify their economies, and generate much-needed
tax revenue.258  Americans are betting on sports more now than
they ever have in the past and the time has come to officially deem
PASPA a failure.259
Christopher Polisano*
256. See id. (meaning that use of public support could be powerful tool for
lawmakers in favor of legalization to persuade other members of Congress to sup-
port repeal of PASPA).
257. For a detailed discussion on why PASPA is counterproductive, see supra
notes 181–215 and accompanying text (arguing that PASPA’s primary effect is to R
shift betting to illegal markets rather than stop it from happening).
258. See supra notes 181–215 (using such benefits to show that PASPA prima- R
rily serves to aid criminals who take advantage of consumers in unregulated sports
gambling markets and use proceeds for gambling schemes to fund other kinds of
illegal activity).
259. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Betting on sports is an
activity that has unarguably increased in popularity over the last several decades.”);
see also Papadopoulos, supra note 184 (explaining loss of billions of dollars in po- R
tential economic impact due to PASPA).
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law.  I’d like to thank Alex Middlesworth for his interest in this article.
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